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Wages, the Company Store
System, and the Godcharles
v. Wigeman Decision1
Laura Phillips Sawyer, Brown University
In 1886, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down a law that prohib-
ited employers from paying wages in company store scrip and mandated
monthly wage payments. The court held that the legislature could not pre-
scribe mandatory wage contracts for legally competent workingmen. The
decision quashed over two decades of efforts to end the “truck system.”
Although legislators had agreed that wage payments redeemable only in
company store goods appeared antithetical to the free labor wage system,
two obstacles complicated legislative action. Any law meant to enhance
laborers’ rights could neither favor one class over another nor infringe
any workingman’s ability to make voluntary contracts. These distinctions,
however, were not as rigid and laissez faire-oriented as depicted by conven-
tional history. Labor reformers argued that principles of equity must sup-
plement these categories of class legislation and contract freedom. This
essay explores how legal doctrine helped both sides of the anti-truck debate
articulate the contested meanings of liberty. Ultimately, the Godcharles rul-
ing enshrined the specialness of workingmen’s labor contracts and rejected
the use of equity principles to justify contract regulations, but the contro-
versy also informed future labor strategies, especially the turn to state
1The author would like to thank Charles W. McCurdy and Brian Balogh for their
encouragement and support through several drafts of this essay. Michael Holt,
Rachel Shapiro Shelden, Jaime Smith, David Hill, Logan Sawyer, Alex Gourevitch,
and Andrew Meade McGee provided insightful questions and comments on earlier
drafts. Archivists at the Pennsylvania State Archives and the Pennsylvania State
Library, both in Harrisburg, PA, provided indispensable assistance. The original
case files were not located. Two anonymous readers for the Journal for the Gilded
Age and Progressive Era provided enormously helpful feedback.
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police powers as the rubric under which workers’ safety, morals, and
health could be protected.
Upon arriving to work on New Year’s Day of 1884, Frank Wigeman
found that his employer, Godcharles & Company, had posted new
work rules that effectively lowered wages for Wigeman and his fel-
low puddlers who operated furnaces at the rolling mill.2 Founded in
1875, the Godcharles company, located in Milton, Pennsylvania,
maintained the traditional practice of posting shop rules rather
than entering into individual contracts with workers. The new
rules reduced wages both directly and by manipulating the way
each ton was measured. Wigeman, who had worked at the nail
mill for almost a year, walked out, joined a strike, and sued the com-
pany for back wages that had been paid in company store scrip.3
According to an 1881 Pennsylvania law, employers were forbidden
to pay workers in company store orders (as opposed to cash wages).
Even so, Godcharles had continued scrip payments through 1883. In
addition to demanding reinstatement of the original terms of his
contract, Wigeman argued that the company could not post rules
contrary to statutory law. The 1881 law, unique in the United
States at the time, explicitly forbade any private contracts that cir-
cumvented the legislative mandate to pay workingmen in cash
wages.4
The “truck system,” whereby employers paid wages in store orders
for commodities or a currency substitute (that is, scrip), already
2Atlantic Reporter, vol. 6 (St. Paul, 1887), 354–56.
3Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. St. 431 (1886). The original contract paid $4 for one
ton of iron; however, the company set one ton equal to 2,240 pounds. The new con-
tract reduced wages to $3.60 per ton and kept the company’s inflated measure of
one ton. (The “short ton” of 2,000 pounds later became standard.) Meanwhile, the
company maintained the outlawed practice of paying employees with store orders,
while providing only minimal cash. Wigeman sued for $87.67 in arrears. On Milton,
PA, and the Godcharles company, Larry Hill, “A Pictorial History of Milton, PA,”
www.miltonhistory.org (accessed Sept. 22, 2012).
4The 1881 law was entitled, “An act to secure to operatives and laborers, engaged in
and about coal mines, manufactories or iron and steel, and all other manufactories,
the payment of their wages at regular intervals and in lawful money of the United
States,” Pennsylvania Session Laws (Harrisburg, 1881), 147 [hereafter P.L.]. Most labor
laws at this time were “default rules,” which allowed “set-off” contracts that could
abridge the law. In 1868, for example, the Pennsylvania General Assembly passed
an eight-hour law for workingmen, but it was only binding if no contract was
made to the contrary. See “An act to limit the hours of labor constituting a day’s
work in this state to eight hours,” P.L. (Harrisburg, 1868), 99.
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existed in many parts of the Northeast in the eighteenth century.
Early nineteenth-century industrialization encouraged its spread
through remote Pennsylvania mining regions.5 The labor movement
saw this as an example of “wage slavery,” a practice exploitative of
poor, unskilled workers and their families.6 The isolation of mining
towns and the inflated prices of goods at company stores belied
employers’ claims that workers could negotiate better contract
terms.7 Labor cohesion, strikes, mining disasters, state investi-
gations, and political compromises created moments of political
possibility for regulatory action. Still, legal doctrine and language
played a fundamental role in limiting the anti-truck movement
and shaping the contours of labor reform more generally. Indeed,
the law acted as “a restrictive, yet dynamic, force within the
workers’ world.” Within the highly individualistic structure of pri-
vate law, it was not clear how a collective movement might enhance
the legal rights and bargaining powers of a particular class of work-
ingmen. This article focuses on the legal dialogue that defined the
decades-long struggle to end the company store system. The essay
seeks to explain why that system persisted despite widespread
agreement that it degraded free labor.8
Ultimately, Wigeman lost his case against the Godcharles Company.
In 1886, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down the 1881 anti-
truck law as an unconstitutional limitation on workingmen’s free-
dom to make private employment contracts. During legislative
debate, miners and their advocates had successfully argued that
unequal bargaining power between employer and employee consti-
tuted a form of duress, whereby miners’ weakened position made
them powerless to negotiate fair contracts. Thus, they argued, the
company store system violated principles of equity and operated
5The numerous state laws regarding the truck system demonstrate its prevalence in
the late nineteenth-century Northeast. Darius H. Pingree, “The Anti-Truck Laws,
and Some Other Laws—A Legal Criticism,” The American Lawyer 3 (Sept. 1895): 386.
6On the term “wage slavery” in nineteenth-century labor discourse, Amy Dru
Stanley, From Bondage to Contract: Wage Labor, Marriage, and the Market in the Age
of Slave Emancipation (New York, 1998), 86.
7Alexander Trachtenberg, The History of Legislation for the Protection of Coal Miners in
Pennsylvania: 1824–1915 (New York, 1942), 25.
8Leon Fink, “Labor, Liberty, and the Law: Trade Unionism and the Problem of the
American Constitutional Order,” Journal of American History 74 (Dec. 1987): 904–25
(quotation 906). Also, Christopher Tomlins, The State and the Unions: Labor Relations,
Law, and the Organized Labor Movement in America, 1880–1960 (New York, 1985);
Tomlins, “Review Essay, The Consumption of History in the Legal Academy:
Science, Synthesis, Perils, and Prospects,” Journal of Legal Education 61 (Aug. 2011):
139–65.
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outside of the boundaries of legitimate employment contracts.9
Judge Isaac Gordon, writing for the court, disagreed and held that
the law prevented “persons who are sui juris from making their
own contracts.”10 The commonwealth’s police powers could not
extend to protect these workingmen.11 He proclaimed that the law
amounted to “an infringement alike of the rights of the employer
and the employe[e]; more than this, it is an insulting attempt to
put the laborer under legislative tutelage, which is not only degrad-
ing to his manhood, but subversive to his rights as a citizen.”12
Duress could not describe workingmen’s position; instead, it
applied to dependents who by law had limited but protected con-
tract power. As a result, the Godcharles ruling enshrined a special-
ness of private labor contracts by suspending the presumption of
constitutionality, striking down a legislative act, and curtailing the
expansion of state police powers into the private realm of working-
men’s contracts. The case became infamous as a precursor to the
“liberty of contract” era.13
Increasingly, scrip wage payments appeared antithetical to the wage
labor ethos of the Reconstruction years but proved difficult to
9Equity refers to a set of legal principles that supplements common law and/or stat-
utory law when strict application of the law would render an unjust verdict. Equity
jurisdiction allows judges to use discretion and apply flexibility in legal rulings;
judges delivering an equitable remedy do not consult a jury. Cases in equity provide
different legal remedies than cases argued at law. The former does not award mon-
etary damages but provides injunctions or decrees ordering a certain action. See
John Norton Pomeroy, A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence as Administered in the
United States of America; Adapted for all the States, and to the Union of Legal and
Equitable Remedies under the Reformed Procedure, vol. 1 (San Francisco, CA, 1881),
introduction. Also Brendan F. Brown, “Equity in the Law of the United States of
America” in Equity in the World’s Legal Systems, ed. Ralph Newman (Brussels,
Belgium, 1973), 205–22, esp. 206. Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of
American Law, 1780–1860 (Cambridge, MA, 1977), esp. 165–67, 69. Horwitz explains
that in the eighteenth century, courts would not enforce contracts where inadequate
consideration could be proved. This changed in the nineteenth century with the
advent of the law merchant governing contractual relations.
10Godcharles, 437.
11“Police power” refers to the power of the state to regulate to protect public health,
safety, and morals. William J. Novak, Intellectual Origins of the State Police Power: The
Common Law Vision of a Well-Regulated Society (Madison, 1989).
12Godcharles, 437.
13William E. Forbath, “Politics, State Building, and the Courts, 1870–1920” in
Cambridge History of American Law, ed. Michael Grossberg and Christopher
Tomlins (New York, 2008), 643–96, esp. 648–49.
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eliminate by statutory action.14 This essay examines the political and
legal tactics employed by workingmen’s trade groups to extend the
principles of law and equity to include sui juris men and to regulate
working conditions within the so-called “ordinary trades.”15
Conventional histories of Gilded Age constitutionalism tend to pre-
sent “liberty of contract” as a monolithic, rigid, and inflexible doc-
trine intended to suppress labor activism.16 The anti-truck debate
of the 1870s and 1880s, however, demonstrates the ambiguities
and tensions within that system. Advocates of protective labor legis-
lation put forth principles of equity and fairness that cut against the
emergent vision of formalistic “liberty of contract.” Reformers had
greatest success expanding state police powers to protect working-
men’s health and safety in dangerous trades, such as mining.17
While workers made strong political and sociological arguments
against the truck system, they faced roadblocks in their efforts to
secure cash payments of wages. Equally strong legal precedent
regarded certain types of protective laws as “class legislation” that
14David Montgomery, Beyond Equality: Labor and the Radical Republicans, 1862–1872
(1967; Urbana, 1981); Charles W. McCurdy, “Government-Business Relations:
Some Parameters of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 1863–1897,” Journal of
American History 61 (Mar. 1975): 970–1005; McCurdy, “The ‘Liberty of Contract’
Regime in American Law” in The State and Freedom of Contract, ed. Harry N.
Scheiber (Stanford, CA, 1998); Eric Foner, Reconstruction: An Unfinished Revolution,
1863–1877 (New York, 1988); Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of
the Republican Party Before the Civil War (1970; New York, 1995); Howard Gillman,
The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise of Lochner Era Police Powers
Jurisprudence (Durham, NC, 1993); Stephen A. Siegel, “The Revision Thickens,”
Law and History Review 20 (Autumn 2002): 631–37. Standard interpretations of
Gilded Age private and public law include Owen Fiss, Troubled Beginnings of the
Modern State, 1888–1910 (New York, 1993); William Wiecek, The Lost World of
Classical Legal Thought: Law and Ideology in America, 1886–1937 (New York, 1998).
For a distillation of several revisionist perspectives, Gary D. Rowe, “Lochner
Revisionism Revisited,” Law & Social Inquiry 24 (Winter 1999): 221–52.
15McCurdy, “Government-Business Relations,” 977, 997. In the 1870s, the U.S.
Supreme Court defined an “ordinary trade” as a private business enjoying no
benefit of public subsidies and not affected by the public interest.
16For a standard narrative regarding the rise and decline of “liberty of contract,”
Peter Irons, A People’s History of the Supreme Court: The Men and Women Whose
Cases and Decisions Have Shaped Our Constitution (New York, 1999), 248–65, 307–
18; Lawrence Friedman, A History of American Law, rev. ed. (New York, 2001),
404–23, 548–49. For an account that depicts “liberty of contract” as falling out of
judicial favor through the early 1920s and 1930s, Barry Cushman, Rethinking the
New Deal Court: The Structure of a Constitutional Revolution (New York, 1998).
17James W. Fox Jr., “The Law of Many Faces: Antebellum Contract Law Background
of Reconstruction Era Freedom of Contract,” American Journal of Legal History 49
(2007): 61–112. Also, A. W. B. Simpson, “The Horwitz Thesis and the History of
Contracts,” University of Chicago Law Review 46 (1979): 533–601.
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benefited private individuals through the use of public laws.18 By
fitting the Godcharles ruling within the context of late nineteenth-
century disputes regarding the limits to state police powers, it
may be reconciled with other cases in which the courts upheld
police powers regulations affecting “reasonable rates” for certain
workers19 and industries.20
This essay argues that the Godcharles ruling did not result solely
from the machinations of the bench, but rather rested on evolving
notions of liberty espoused by both sides of the anti-truck debate:
the rise of “liberty of contract,” antipathy to “class legislation,”
and the demise of equity jurisprudence. The Godcharles ruling
does not reflect the attempt to impose allegedly immutable laissez-
faire economic rules on the law, as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
later charged.21 The case instead demonstrates limits imposed by
legal and political culture upon legislative action intended to
enhance workingmen’s private rights in the post-Civil War era.
The case represents the failure of late nineteenth-century public
use and police power doctrines to extend their guidance to
18Michael Les Benedict, “Laissez Faire and Liberty: A Re-evaluation of the Meaning
and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism,” Law and History Review 3 (Autumn
1985): 293–331, 305. As Benedict explains, “‘class,’ or ‘special’ legislation [meant]
using the power of government for the benefits of particular groups at the expense
of the rest of society. It made government the means of theft, the direct antithesis of
the legitimate purpose of government, which all knew was to offer protection
against such wrongs. It was this conviction, a fundamental idea about right and
wrong, not a doctrinaire belief in the inefficiency of government economic interven-
tion that lay at the heart of American laissez-faire constitutionalism.” Similar ideas
were expressed throughout the public debate on the truck system. By bringing in
such legal concepts and considerations, one complicates the older and still wide-
spread view that “liberty of contract” jurisprudence arose from legislators’ and jur-
ists’ acceptance of social Darwinism or laissez-faire economics. For this older
explanation, see Benjamin Twiss, Lawyers and the Constitution: How Laissez Faire
Came to the Supreme Court (Princeton, 1942). Also Arnold M. Paul, Conservative
Crisis and the Rule of Law: Attitudes of Bar and Bench, 1887–1895 (New York, 1969).
19As in, most famously, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
20The implication of rulings such as Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1873), and Ruggles
v. Illinois, 108 U.S. 526 (1883), which held that the state of Illinois could apply its
police powers in a broad way to the railroads, on account of that industry’s special
nature.
21Many legal scholars know Godcharles as a precedent in the notorious U.S. Supreme
Court decision, Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), 63. Holmes’s much-cited dis-
sent in this case included his denunciation of the majority as “enact[ing] Mr. Herbert
Spencer’s Social Statics.” Holmes did not directly refer to Godcharles. McCurdy, “The
‘Liberty of Contract’ Regime,” 163–97; Herbert Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American
Law, 1836–1937 (Cambridge, MA, 1991), 182.
290 | Phillips Sawyer | Contested Meanings of Freedom
labor-strife management.22 The case also demonstrates the blurred
distinction between protective social legislation and emancipatory
negative rights during the “liberty of contract” era. The inadequa-
cies of the “liberty of contract” doctrine became more evident
when labor advocates began to attack the company store system
using equity jurisprudence, which liberty of contract could not
readily accommodate.
The Pennsylvania court declared that the great danger to individual
liberty remained the arbitrary use of government power to favor one
class at the expense of another; that is, unequal bargaining power
could not legitimize taking from A to give to B within an ordinary
trade not touched by the public interest.23 Formal legal equality
seemed to cut both ways, leaving workingmen’s private rights intact
but not positively enhanced. Although a long tradition of public
interest regulation and rules of equity existed in Pennsylvania, the
ideological and legal preference for abstract general laws limited
liberal-democratic policy solutions to laborers’ demands.24 The
truck system was no longer consonant with the predominant econ-
omic and social context, but the accepted legal norms of formal
equal rights stymied political remedies.
The truck system controversy involved the reconsideration of the
parameters and underlying rationale of government intervention
over ordinary workingmen’s labor contracts. The essay first explores
the contradictions between the truck system and the free labor wage
system in practice. Identifying this system as a violation of equity
principles inspired social legislation to curb these “evils” that
“made men unfree.”25 As I then explain, proponents of anti-truck
legislation worked within the overlapping spheres of private rights
22McCurdy, “Government-Business Relations,” 1005.
23Wiecek, Lost World, 48.
24Legal scholar G. Edward White explains the formalistic mindset this way: “A par-
ticular interest of intellectuals in the quarter century after the war was conceptual-
ization—the transformation of data into theories of universal applicability. Their
source of unity was to be methodological: the ‘scientific’ ordering of knowledge.”
G. Edward White, “The Intellectual Origins of Tort in America,” Yale Law Journal
86 (1977): 671–93 (quotation 676). See also: Morton Horwitz, “The Rise of Legal
Formalism,” Journal of American Legal History 19 (1975): 251–64; Harry Scheiber,
“Instrumentalism and Property Rights: A Reconsideration of American ‘Styles of
Judicial Reasoning’ in the Nineteenth Century,”Wisconsin Law Review 1 (1975): 1–18.
25Already in 1863, Governor Andrew Gregg Curtin called upon the Pennsylvania
General Assembly to alleviate the “evils” of the truck system. “Report of the
Bureau of Industrial Statistics,” Legislative Documents (Harrisburg, 1879–80), 2:361
(hereafter Legis. Doc.).
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and public interest in order to reconsider and extend the reach of
police powers.26 By deploying principles of equity to define truck
contracts as contrary to the wage labor system, nearly two decades
of anti-truck legislative debate and the resulting 1881 law expanded
public regulation of workingmen’s employment contracts. Perhaps
most significantly, the final anti-truck law sought to equalize bar-
gaining power between employer and employee by forbidding
any private contract to circumvent the law. Thus it applied to all
workingmen in mining and manufacturing regardless of individual
agreements to the contrary.27 Still, in the end, the failure of this
novel legislation to pass constitutional muster informed future
legal strategies of social and political protest.28 As the events of
the anti-truck controversy unfolded, two predominant intellectual
traditions emerged on either side of the debate. “New Liberals”
favored voluntary action by private organizations and a highly for-
malized legal structure to govern all individual labor contracts,
whereas progressive advocates of the anti-truck law supported an
industrial democracy that harnessed state power to protect politi-
cally or economically marginalized groups.29
Petitions sent to the 1863 legislative session protested against the
unequal bargaining power that “render[ed workingmen] almost
entirely dependent upon the will of their employers for the amount
of their wages and the mode of their payment.”30 The petitions
claimed that the truck system reduced workingmen to a dependent
status, to “wage slavery.” Laborers’ independence could only be
achieved through more equitable contract terms, namely regular
cash payments.31 Proponents of regulatory action against the truck
26For a contemporary view of the application of police power to liberty of contract
issues: Frederick N. Judson, “Liberty of Contract under the Police Powers,” The
American Law Review 25 (1891): 873.
27Louis Hartz, Economic Policy and Democratic Thought: Pennsylvania 1776–1860
(Cambridge, MA, 1948), 191, 262.
28William E. Forbath, “The Shaping of the American Labor Movement,” Harvard
Law Review 102 (Apr. 1989): 1109–1256.
29Brian Balogh, A Government Out of Sight: The Mystery of National Authority in the
Nineteenth Century (New York, 2009), 352–54.
30“Records of the General Assembly, House of Representatives, House File,” 1863,
House File, 87th Session, folder 8, box 19, 1-0224, Record Group 7, Pennsylvania
State Archives, Harrisburg. The legislature first received petitions calling for the
end to the company store system back in 1843. James Lynn Barnard, Factory
Legislation in Pennsylvania: Its History and Administration (Philadelphia, 1907), 37.
31The surviving 1863 petitions all contain the same printed language. Unequal
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system did not seek emancipation from wage labor per se. Instead,
these petitioners demanded equal rights and strengthened bargain-
ing power. Over time laborers and labor activists involved in build-
ing the foundations of protective labor legislation came to define
equal rights in terms of established equitable legal norms.
As was the tradition in many isolated mining communities through-
out Pennsylvania, employers posted advertisements for workers
Figures 1–2. Examples of scrip from Pennsylvania coal mines, reprinted in
“Report of the Bureau of Industrial Statistics,” Legislative Documents
(Harrisburg, 1879–1880), 2:369–72.
bargaining power “render[s workingmen] almost entirely dependent upon the will
of their employers for the amount of their wages and the mode of their payment;
that their said employers have in many instances paid their wages or part of their
wages in order upon storekeepers and shopkeepers for articles of merchandise;
that said shopkeepers and storekeepers charge them a very large profit upon the
goods and merchandise received in payment on said orders, and that be reason
of this system your petitioners suffer very grievously.”
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that stipulated the terms of the labor contract. Payday at the
Godcharles mill, for example, occurred regularly, and laborers
received an envelope of cash less the advances taken from the com-
pany store. Company stores were not always owned or operated by
the mine operator or boss. Still, issuing scrip to a particular store
generally denoted a partnership between the employer and the
store owner or lessee. Scrip redeemable only in one store ensured
an automatic customer base and usually signaled a profit-sharing
agreement if a single entity did not already own both the mine
and store.32
Company store scrip was supposed to be non-transferable. Holders
who sought to purchase goods outside of the company store might
still exchange the scrip for cash, but exchange carried a discount that
was onerous for already hard-pressed workers. Company stores
were known to carry high-quality merchandise but largely at
inflated prices compared to cash-only stores.33
In 1879, the Pennsylvania Bureau of Labor Statistics delivered a
report to the General Assembly on the company store system. The
interviews and mailed questionnaires illustrated the workingmen’s
frustrations:
As denominated by many workmen, the “pluck-me”
system, is one that has caused considerable complaint
throughout the State for years. It is the payment of
wages in store goods, or, as many workingmen say,
in “calico and molasses.” This system, when arbitrarily
enforced, is, to say the least, very unjust, or especially
when work is scarce, for then workmen’s necessities
are taken advantage of, and his wages paid in part or
in whole in store goods, at exorbitant prices.34
The goods available in the company store and the pricing structure
of those goods demonstrated the inequities of the truck system. Not
only did the truck system sell merchandise at inflated prices, com-
pany stores often operated a dual price system—one for scrip pay-
ments and another price for cash-paying customers.35 The price
32“Report of the Bureau of Industrial Statistics,” 2:367–88.
33Trachtenberg, Protection of Coal Miners, 16.
34“Report of the Bureau of Industrial Statistics,” 2:354.
35“Report of the Bureau of Industrial Statistics,” 2:354, elaborated on profit allo-
cation in the truck system: “The store allows a percentage to the firm issuing the
orders, upon all sales made, thus adding to the profits of the manufacturer a sum
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discrepancy underscored the increased transaction cost imposed on
workers to the benefit of employers.36
Nevertheless, the truck system retained some vocal supporters. Facing
a dearth of capital, especially during coal price slumps or widespread
economic downturns, the company store allowed employers to pro-
vide for workingmen and their families. In 1863, Senator John
P. Penney of Allegheny County stated, “There are hundreds of
cases in which the families of laborers are better protected by the sys-
tem which gives to the wife an order for her flour, meat and groceries,
than they would be by that which gives to an improvident husband
the hard cash at the end of the week.”37 Some storeowners and mine
operators defended it as necessary, if not beneficial to workers.38
Moreover, when interviewed by a state official, mine owners and
operators insisted that workers did not complain and, if requested,
cash could be made available.39 Finally, if laborers wanted a better
bargain, they were free to leave, if they did not carry debt with the
company store. Of course, the geographic isolation of some mining
communities that made the company store a necessity would have
impeded laborers’ free movement as well.40
extorted from the amount paid to the wage worker, without the consent of the
worker himself, to whom, as earnings, it justly belongs.” When questioned by a
clerk for the Bureau of Industrial Statistics, a bookkeeper for a company store in
Plymouth, PA, explained that because the store paid a premium of 4 percent on
scrip payments to the company issuing the scrip, the store therefore lowered the
cost to cash customers by 5 percent. Ibid., 2:378–80.
36“The comparison of prices, as given in the above returns, will average 16 2/3 per
cent. higher in company stores then in others.” Ibid., 2:386.
37Pennsylvania. Senate bill No. 255, “An Act to prevent the payment of workmen
and laborers in orders upon storekeepers,” in Pennsylvania Legislative Record, PA,
1863, 708 (hereafter PA Legis. Record). Since I did this research, these records have
become available at http://www.phmc.state.pa.us/bah/dam/rg/sd/r7sd2.htm#7.51.
38For example, see the testimony of Franklin Gowen, owner of the Reading Railroad.
Pennsylvania General Assembly, “Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, (General)
of the Senate of Pennsylvania in Relation to the Coal Difficulties, with accompanying
testimony,” Legis. Doc. (Harrisburg, 1871), 1528–34. Gowen, however, had his own
motives. In the early 1870s, he maneuvered to purchase large tracts of coal mining
land through the lower anthracite region of Pennsylvania, where small owners and
mine operators traditionally existed. It seems that the larger, corporate mines might
have had an easier time establishing and maintaining company stores, as opposed
to the smaller mining concerns that were more susceptible to the demands of their
laborers. On Gowen’s business ventures and anti-labor union activity, Kevin Kenny,
Making Sense of the Molly Maguires (New York, 1998), 48.
39“Report of Labor,” Legis. Doc. (Harrisburg, 1874), 1:430–36.
40See Trachtenberg, Protection of Coal Miners, for more details on the company store
system in practice.
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Despite the handful of people who supported the company store sys-
tem, political opinion turned decisively against the institution during
the labor unrest of the Civil War years. Defending the truck system
as a benign, even paternalistic institution appeared increasingly ana-
chronistic within the postbellum wage labor system. In January of
1863, Republican governor Andrew Gregg Curtin made the first
gubernatorial request for legislation to bring an end to the truck sys-
tem.41 He called attention to the unfreedoms of the truck system: “a sys-
tem most unwise and unjust, and it affects classes of useful citizens
who, as they live by the proceeds of their daily labor, have not ade-
quate means to resist it.”42 Answering his call for protective legislation,
Senator John Reilly introduced legislation to “prevent the payment of
workmen and laborers in orders upon store-keepers.”43 Reilly, who
represented one of the largest mining districts in the commonwealth
(Schuylkill County), identified the problem as fairly limited and con-
fined the bill’s application to only certain types of workingmen.
In April, both houses of the Pennsylvania General Assembly passed
the anti-truck bill with only one day of discussion each, but
Governor Curtin vetoed the act, even though he had called for the
legislation.44 While proponents focused on laborers’ petitions and
assertions of economic coercion, a critical handful of opponents
denied the constitutionality of a compulsory labor law and lambasted
the bill as detrimental to the mining trade. No one mentioned the pro-
blem of curtailing private contract freedom; that was not the issue.
The act could not pass constitutional muster because it failed to incor-
porate all Pennsylvanian workingmen, focusing too narrowly on par-
ticular industries.45 The bill counted as special legislation, too
imperfect and ambiguous. Thus the first anti-truck act failed.
Similar to special-interest legislation in later periods, in the late nine-
teenth century “class legislation” referred to partial or unequal
restraints or subsidies allocated to a certain group of people.46
41“Report of the Bureau of Industrial Statistics,” 2:361. The text of the 1863 bill as
well as Governor Curtin’s address to the legislature are reprinted here.
42Curtin quoted in Trachtenberg, Protection of Coal Miners, 15–16. Trachtenberg
quotes Governor Curtin’s speech.
43PA Legis. Record, 1863, 707.
44The bill passed with wide margins in both Houses. Senate vote: 24–9; House vote:
85–4. Ibid., 707, 796.
45“Report of the Bureau of Industrial Statistics,” 2:361.
46Gillman, The Constitution Besieged, 61–62, emphasizes the long history of the “mas-
ter principle of neutrality,” beginning with the founding and developing through
the Jacksonian era.
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Curtin’s 1863 veto foreshadowed a continuous problem in the for-
mulation of an anti-truck law. In order to extend the public-interest
rationale to eliminate the truck system, it proved necessary to create
a law general in its reach and application, not specific to particular
occupations or localities. Historian Louis Hartz, writing in the mid-
twentieth century, along with revisionist legal historians more
recently, traced the legal tradition of general laws and popular pol-
itical antipathy toward “class legislation” to the Jacksonian equal
rights movement of the 1830s.47 In Pennsylvania, adherents to the
Jacksonian equal rights tradition co-opted language of democratic
“equal rights” and constructed a “classical” legal idiom that empha-
sized limited legislative intervention into the economy as an end in
and of itself. Similar to the rejection of special legislation as anti-
democratic, a peculiar legislative preference for non-mandatory
labor laws aggravated policy solutions.48
In 1868, the Pennsylvania General Assembly passed a non-
compulsory, eight-hour law applicable to all wage earners.49
Because this was a default rule—that is, the law applied only to
workers who did not agree to “set-off” contracts that legally defined
terms of an individual’s employment—workingmen found it largely
unenforceable. In this era, binding labor contracts at common law
were generally unwritten agreements, sometimes constituting noth-
ing more than “governing rules” posted on the shop floor or cus-
tomary workplace relationships.50 Not long after the passage of
the eight-hour rule, mine workers in Schuylkill County attempted
to quit work after the legal workday. Mine operators, however,
felt no legal obligation to honor the law. In June, laborers in the
Schuylkill mines responded by walking off the job and strikes
spread quickly to neighboring mines and counties.51
The mining strikes lasted several months and ended in compromise,
with only moderate gains in wages. Significant organizational gains,
however, promised future success. The Workingmen’s Benevolent
47Louis Hartz, Economic Policy, 126, 161, 166–67, 175.
48John Fabian Witt, “Rethinking the Nineteenth-Century Employment Contract,
Again,” Law and History Review 18 (Fall 2000): 627–57.
49The default rule sought “to limit the hours of labor constituting a day’s work in
this state to eight hours.” P.L. (Harrisburg, 1868), 99.
50William A. Sullivan, The Industrial Worker in Pennsylvania: 1800–1840 (Harrisburg,
1955), 34–35. On the changing context of such default rules, Karen Orren, Belated
Feudalism: Labor, the Law, and Liberal Development in the United States (New York,
1991).
51“Report of Labor,” 1874, 1:309–11.
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Association (W.B.A.), established at the time of the strike, coordi-
nated an industry-wide craft union, which proved most successful
in the lower anthracite region where small and independent mines
predominated.52 The eight-hour default rule remained a dead letter,
utterly failing to reorder the bargaining power between employer
and employee. Still, the W.B.A. expanded its efforts to protect
skilled laborers through a variety of legislative measures, such as
lien laws and safety regulations, as well as hours laws.53 This
marked a turning point in laborers’ strategy to garner legislative
support, rather than only bargain with employers for control of
the workplace.
The 1868 eight-hour law demonstrated the limitations of legislative
power to proscribe certain contractual relations. Although news-
paper articles and workingmen’s associations called for more
effective laws regarding the length of workdays and other grie-
vances, many Pennsylvanians doubted the constitutionality of
compulsory protective laws. Most who commented on the issue
did not offer precise legal reasoning, but they accepted the limitation
of police powers when confronted with preserving workingmen’s
contract freedom.54 Non-mandatory contract regulations failed to
explicitly confront the economic and social inequalities at issue;
instead they allowed private contracts to determine employment
relations.55
Despite the difficulties of policing private contracts, the passage and
enforcement of workplace safety and health regulations expanded
state police power regulations into the realm of workingmen’s
ordinary trades. In 1870, the Pennsylvania legislature passed the
commonwealth’s first general health and safety law stipulating
mandatory mine ventilation practices and equipment. The law
extended over all counties and provided a system of inspections
to insure compliance with air quality in the mines.56 One leading
scholar of trade unionism in coal-mining Pennsylvania has
remarked that the Mine Safety Act of 1870 “was distinctly double-
edged.” While a victory for labor activists, it also bolstered the
52Kenny, Molly Maguires, 66–68, 111–12.
53Ibid., 102.
54McCurdy, “‘Liberty of Contract’ Regime,” 171–72.
55John V. Orth, “Contract and the Common Law” in The State and Freedom of
Contract, ed. Scheiber, 60.
56The Avondale mining disaster of September 6, 1869, which took the lives of 179
miners, accelerated the turn to police-power-based legislative regulation of mine
safety. Trachtenberg, Protection of Coal Miners, 36, 41.
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power of mine owners and operators to control the workplace, as
opposed to strengthening union control. Legally, however, the
expansion of police powers into the mining industry represented
an important step toward an anti-truck law.57
The following year, a mine owner challenged the safety law’s consti-
tutionality, complaining of the “great pecuniary loss to which [own-
ers] will be subjected in the use of their own property, if the
provisions of the act of assembly in question be strictly enforced.”58
Nevertheless, state Judge Garrick M. Harding upheld the law as a
valid expansion of the commonwealth’s police power over certain
property rights:
If the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, through her
Legislature, can police our towns and cities, why
may she not police the coal mines within her border?
If, through her Legislature, she can attach conditions,
rules and regulations, which are to be observed by
her citizens in the use of their own peculiar property,
what is there about coal mines, or the owners thereof
that should specially exempt them from her supervi-
sion and control? If she recognizes as part of her
organic law, applicable to the property of her citizens,
the rule, long ago grew into maxim, sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas, why may she not make it equally
applicable to the lives of her own citizens?59
Harding’s interpretation of an “organic law” of police powers easily
extended over mining safety regulations.
In 1872, Harding again enforced the 1870 mine safety law against
constitutional challenges and expanded his defense of the legisla-
ture’s use of police powers.60 It would be, he continued, “an exercise
of unblushing presumption on our part to set at naught a statute
thus originated, and which was passed for the special and declared
57Kenny, Molly Maguires, 129.
58Commonwealth v. Bonnell, 8 Phila. 534 (1871). Text of the case may be found in:
Legis. Doc. (Harrisburg, 1871), 927–37.
59Ibid. (Emphasis in original.) The Latin phrase sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedus
means “use your property so as not to injure another.” On use of this legal phrase
in the nineteenth century to uphold municipal and state regulations, see William J.
Novak, The People’s Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century America
(Chapel Hill, 1996).
60Commonwealth v. Wilkes-Barre Coal Co., 29 L.J. 213 (1872).
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purpose of protecting the health and the lives of a very large class of
citizens.. . .In effect it would be making, and not expounding the
law.”61 Moreover, Harding reiterated the court’s position of defer-
ence to “legislative wisdom” and a duty to presume an act consti-
tutional.62 Thus, Harding’s rulings encouraged the extension of
police powers via progressive labor legislation when legitimated
by protecting the public interest in miners’ health and safety.
The ongoing debate over anti-truck legislation began to build upon
police power arguments, such as those articulated by Judge
Harding. Proponents extended this reasoning to regulations
intended to safeguard and perhaps strengthen the economic welfare
of mine laborers. Beginning in 1873, the “long depression” of the
late nineteenth century deflated coal prices and laborers’ wages.63
Between 1870 and 1873, laborers’ wages had already declined by
an estimated 33 percent,64 in part due to a series of unfavorable arbi-
tration agreements between the W.B.A. and the mine owners’
Arbitration Board of Trade, which Franklin Gowen had effectively
captured by 1871.65 These economic and organizational setbacks
for the W.B.A. diminished its control and coordination of laborers
in the commonwealth. The economic downturn exacerbated politi-
cal discontent, culminating in the establishment of a new third
party intent to redistribute economic wealth and power.
As a direct response to the Panic of 1873, the Greenback Party
formed in 1874 and appealed to agrarian and debtor interests that
61Ibid. (Emphasis in original.)
62Harding continued, “Quoting, as we did in Bonnell’s case, substantially, from one
of the very eminent jurists of our State, a constitution lays down certain great and
fundamental principles, according to which the several departments it calls into
existence are to govern the people; but all auxiliary rules which are to give effect
to these principles must, form the necessity of the case, come from the legislature.
It is for this very purpose that the constitution establishes a legislature.” Ibid.
63While anti-truck proposals arose every year, from 1863 to 1872 these died on first,
second, or third reading. Unfortunately, records from the Judiciary Committee do
not exist. However, recommendations of the committee were usually read with
the bill on whichever reading. The focus during these years appears to have been
on local legislation, pertaining only to a district or county. These local laws were
made unconstitutional in the Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention of 1874.
64Legis. Doc. (Harrisburg, 1875), 374.
65Kenny, Molly Maguires, 139, 148, 176. By 1874, the Reading Railroad, through its
creation by state charter of the Philadelphia & Reading Iron & Coal Co., owned
over 100,000 acres of coal land and dominated the mining industry of the lower
anthracite region. The W.B.A. held considerably more bargaining power with
small-scale mine owners and operators; thus, when the Reading Railroad controlled
those interests, the W.B.A. effectively lost its opportunity at trade unionism.
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favored cheap money policies; the party also campaigned to expand
protective labor laws.66 In Pennsylvania, the most zealous defenders
of anti-truck regulations hailed from this party and considered it the
foremost duty of the state to provide cheap money and protective
social legislation for laborers.
In 1874, “Honest Mike” M’Cullough, a self-proclaimed advocate
for workingmen, brought an anti-truck bill before the
Pennsylvania House of Representatives.67 The bill mandated
that all laborers in the commonwealth receive biweekly wage pay-
ments in cash. Failing this, companies would be penalized at 6
percent interest per annum on wages in arrears.68
Representative M’Cullough defended his bill as a necessary pro-
tection of workingmen’s right to wages and a measure to end
labor unrest. “Honest Mike” and other proponents peppered
floor speeches with direct quotes from laborers’ demands
for legislative action. The Eagle, a newspaper produced by the
W.B.A. and edited by M’Cullough, published a lengthy defense
of the proposed legislation. “Weekly payments are the poor
man’s right. If he spends it, it is his own, and no one has a
right to dictate to him in regard to it. He can buy cheaper for cash,
and where and what he thinks proper to buy, and there is not
so much of a temptation to dishonesty.”69 The argument to allevi-
ate the truck system’s economic coercion and enhance working-
men’s freedom remained the paramount issue to laborers.70
Representative Henry H. McCormick, a Pittsburgh Democrat who
opposed the anti-truck law, succinctly stated the impasse provoked
by M’Cullough’s bill: workingmen’s contract rights could not be
reconciled with an immutable prohibition of certain labor contracts.
“The gentlemen all know as well as I do,”McCormick insisted, “that
they cannot take away the right of the manufacturers to make what-
ever contract they see fit with their employees. They understand it.
We all understand it, on both sides of the House.” The notion of
endowing positive rights onto workingmen, as many opponents
66“Pennsylvania Greenbackers,” New York Times, Mar. 24, 1880; Mark A. Lause, The
Civil War’s Last Campaign: James B. Weaver, the Greenback-Labor Party and the Politics of
Race and Section (Lantham, MD, 2001).
67PA Legis. Record, 1874, 1727.
68Ibid.
69The article, “Workingmen’s Meeting—An Important Occasion,” Reading Eagle,
n.d., was reprinted in the PA Legis, Record, 1874, 1727.
70“Strike in Pennsylvania: The Scrip Payments of the Lancaster Manufacturing
Company—Dissatisfied Workmen,” New York Times, Sept. 17, 1874, 7.
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of anti-truck reform described it, offended the classical legal prin-
ciples of economic autonomy and equal rights.
McCormick continued, “What I object to in this bill, is this provision
holding out the belief to the working classes that they have a right to
go and demand their wages every two weeks—that any contract
that they may make to the contrary is against the law.”71 An immu-
table rule, opponents argued, substantially changed the rights and
obligations of workingmen’s contracts in such a way irreconcilable
with free labor employment contracts. Lacking a clear demon-
stration of individual duress, vested wage labor contracts remained
irreducible, and prohibiting future truck contracts seemed implausi-
ble. “So long as the contract is not against public policy or against
good morals, every citizen has the right to make it. I take it that
this is not a contract against either.” Legislators seemed to consider
the balance between individual rights and state intervention as a
zero-sum game, that is, the increase of public power necessarily
diminished private rights. The impasse could not be resolved via
police powers to limit individual’s contract and property rights;
alternatively, proponents searched for other pathways to prohibit
company stores and scrip wage payments.
In lieu of a direct prohibition of company stores, labor advocates
sought to curtail the creation of additional company stores by pro-
hibiting any state charters to sanction such stores. By definition cor-
porations existed as artificial constructions of the state; thus, the
terms of a corporate charter could be manipulated by the legislature,
especially if deemed in the public interest.72 In 1874, Senator Miles
S. Humphreys, a labor reformer and radical Republican, amended
a general incorporation act to prohibit any future incorporated char-
ters from owning or operating a company store. “My object,”
Humphreys explained, “was to confine corporations strictly to one
line of business, and forbid them from supplying their employees
71Legis. Doc. (Harrisburg, 1875), 374. (Emphasis added.)
72Naomi Lamoreaux, “Partnerships, Corporations, and the Limits on Contractual
Freedom in U.S. History: An Essay in Economics, Law, and Culture” in
Constructing Corporate America: History, Politics, Culture, ed. Kenneth Lipartito and
David Sicilia (New York, 2004), 33–34. For example, in Boyd v. Alabama, 94 U.S.
645 (1876), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a state law that prohibited lotteries. A
lottery being carried out under a formerly permissive law “did not estop the state
from denying its constitutionality.” (Ibid., 646.) In Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S.
814 (1880), the Court upheld Mississippi’s prohibition of lotteries, even though
this required abridging a vested contract to carry out a lottery made prior to the
repeal of the lottery law. Both cases illustrate the “inalienability doctrine” regarding
a state’s police powers to regulate public health and morals.
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with calico and molasses in lieu of money for wages, and thus
secure them better opportunities to live prosperous lives, instead
of dragging along an existence under the bondage of debt.”73 The
prospective corporation law, however, could not affect existing com-
pany stores. Thus, the problem of the truck system persisted.
In 1876, legislators continued to focus on the problem of “class legis-
lation” as the preeminent hurdle to passage. The 1874 constitutional
convention had produced a new prohibition of “special” or “class”
legislation.74 Debate increasingly focused on what constituted a gen-
eral law. Senator William H. Stanton of Luzerne County admitted
that his proposed anti-truck bill qualified as class legislation but
no more than any number of pro-capital bills. He added that
“enslaved” workers existed in a context that incapacitated their abil-
ity to bargain fairly with employers.75 Any anti-truck law that func-
tioned merely as a default rule would fail to mitigate the coercion
prevalent in the system.
In response to Stanton, Senator Andrew Jackson Herr, a prominent
lawyer from Dauphin County, initiated what would become his
annual harangue regarding the unconstitutionality of special laws
to prohibit truck system contracts, especially those that prohibited
set-off contracts. Herr, who frequently sat as the Senate’s president
pro tempore, staged the most consistent legal attack against any anti-
truck proposals. Herr quoted Thomas Cooley’s Constitutional
Limitations to emphasize the necessity of general rules to protect
individual liberty and equality.76 He stated, “First, this bill is a
local one because it is confined to a particular locality. Secondly, it
is a special one because it refers to a particular class. Thirdly, it is
local and special because it related to a particular class in a
73PA Legis. Record, 1876, 707.
74Pennsylvania Constitution of 1874, Article 3, Section 7.
75PA Legis. Record, 1876, 607–08, 612. Stanton read from a circular from Joseph
Walton & Company, a mining operation, that threatened to discharge workingmen
who did not use the company store. Stanton further pointed out that eight corpor-
ations controlled Luzerne County mining operations. Once indebted, he insisted
miners could not escape the cycle of company store coercion.
76“Everyone has a right to demand that he be governed by general rules, and a
special statute that singles his case out as one to be regulated by a different law
from that which is applied in all similar cases, would not be legitimate legislation,
but an arbitrary mandate, unrecognized in free government.” Thomas M. Cooley,
A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest upon Legislative Power of the
States of the American Nation (Boston, 1871), 391.
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particular locality.”77 For Herr, the anti-truck proposals required a
set-off provision. Otherwise there was little to debate.
The labor unrest that continued to afflict the coal mines of
Pennsylvania reached new heights in 1877, when a nationwide rail-
road workers’ strike centered in Pennsylvania. Laborers had contin-
ued to organize against falling wages and onerous piece-rate
systems in the late 1860s and early 1870s. Again, Gowen spear-
headed the movement against trade unions. He catalyzed the
famous Molly Maguire episode by hiring a detective to infiltrate
the W.B.A., which eventually led to labor conspiracy charges against
several union members.78 The widespread labor unrest of 1877
coupled with the conviction and execution of nineteen W.B.A. mem-
bers in the Molly Maguire unrest contributed to heightened urgency
about the “labor question” in legislative debates.
The elimination of the causes of strikes and riots became as central
to the anti-truck defense as the arguments of systemic economic
coercion. Senator Thomas B. Schnatterly, who became the leading
proponent of labor reform, declared that the company store system
“has encouraged disobedience to law, has aggravated these people
into associations and combinations, and there is no telling, sir,
unless these causes are removed, where it will end.”79
Representative W.H. Hines of Luzerne County, a former miner
and labor leader, partnered with Schnatterly to sponsor the bill.
Both advocates called legislators’ attention to the testimonies gath-
ered through Bureau of Labor Statistics inquiries into the “labor
question.” In January 1879, Gowen provided key testimony, stating
that miners in his employment demanded “payment in lawful
wages of the United States, of each month’s wages on or before
the fifteenth day of the month succeeding.” Laborers vowed to
“refuse to work thereafter until such payment shall have been
made.”80 Schnatterly and Hines interpreted this to mean that ending
the truck system might mollify laborers on strike.
With greater ubiquity and force, labor organizations published res-
olutions calling for the end to the truck system as a prerequisite to
reconciliation.81 Pennsylvania’s Bureau of Labor Statistics reinforced
77PA Legis. Record, 1876, 744.
78F.P. Dewees, The Molly Maguires: The Origin, Growth, and Character of the
Organization (New York, 1877); Kenny, Molly Maguires, 158, 186, 213.
79PA Legis. Record, 1879, 271.
80Quoted in ibid., 1845–47.
81By the spring of 1879, advocates could cite a stream of labor group resolutions and
304 | Phillips Sawyer | Contested Meanings of Freedom
this conclusion and drew from investigations in other states that also
faced the issue. By 1879, Ohio, New Jersey, and Massachusetts had
passed prospective anti-truck measures, which their respective state
courts had upheld.82 Hines declared that the 1877 strikes were
“indeed caused by that revolt against oppression, which will come
sooner or later, both to the people and the individuals who are
guilty of injustice.”83 The legislature must fulfill its duty to protect
not only the workingmen in Pennsylvania’s mines, Hines argued,
but also the public in general, whose welfare was threatened by
strikes and riots.
Throughout legislative debates, advocates of the anti-truck propo-
sals returned to equity jurisprudence to prove the necessity and pre-
cedent for such interventions into contract and property rights. With
significant sociological and legal evidence compiled by various state
and academic sources, labor activists in the Pennsylvania legislature
redoubled their efforts to demonstrate that the company store sys-
tem constituted economic coercion. According to Pennsylvania
case law raised during legislative debate, principles of equity
allowed judicial intervention into the terms of private contracts,
including labor contracts, if inequity or fraud could be demon-
strated.84 In 1817 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in the case
Perkins v. Gay, held that under principles of equity, evidence of
fraud, unconscionability, or “unfair dealing”would render a private
contract unenforceable.85
newspaper editorials. Hines read from several resolutions from the Workingmen’s
Protective Association in Mercer County, the workingmen from the Coleram
Collieries, and a letter to the “Editors National Labor Tribune” from Fort Pitts,
Pennsylvania on the “accursed order system.” Likewise numerous newspaper edi-
torials and articles were submitted in support of the anti-truck proposal. PA Legis.
Record, 1879, 1843, 1845–46.
82Hines presented a litany of public and expert testimony in favor of an anti-truck
law, including neighboring states’ labor reports, academic reports, such as econom-
ist Francis Amasa Walker’s relevant papers, constituent mail from his district, and
case law. PA Legis. Record, 1879, 1841–50. Schnatterly repeatedly cited the Ohio anti-
truck law; compare PA Legis. Record, 1879, 1162; 1881, 812–14.
83Ibid., 1881, 812–14.
84PA Legis. Record, 1879, 1849.
85Perkins v. Gay, 3 Serg. & Rawle 327 (1817), 332. Judge Gibson, writing for the
majority, affirmed the validity of private contracts made to circumvent a property
boundary line created by the Susquehanna Company commissioner. Gibson upheld
“contracting out,”writing that the “contracts will be valid notwithstanding any mis-
take of one of the parties, provided there be no concealment or unfair dealing by the
opposite party that would affect any other contract.”
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Equity jurisdiction, however, did not provide a straightforward path
to striking down labor contracts that paid workingmen in company
store scrip. First, Pennsylvania courts enforced private contracts that
waived one’s rights granted by statutory law. In Billmeyer v. Evans &
Rodenbaugh, the state supreme court struck down an 1861 “stay law”
that prohibited “contracting out” of the law.86 Thus, legal restraints
remained even if the legislature reached consensus on the evils of
the truck system. Courts could nullify contractual rights and obli-
gations if fraud or unconscionable action was shown, but a tradition
of default rules and “set-off” contracts limited the scope of legisla-
tive and judicial action. Moreover, equity jurisdiction could cut
against labor organizations as well. The doctrine of criminal conspi-
racy allowed judges to declare labor activities unlawful if they were
unlawful in purpose or lawful in purpose but unlawful by means.87
Aware of this problem, proponents of an anti-truck law phrased
regulations in terms of individualized contracts made under duress.
In 1879, Hines and Schnatterly solicited the help of lawyers to craft
an anti-truck bill grounded in legal precedent.88 Drawing from cases
employing principles of equity to overturn vested contracts, Hines
affirmed the judiciary’s duty to hold private contracts unenforceable
if found to be unduly influenced by the “weakness of parties, infrin-
gement on the civil rights of the citizen, [or] oppressive and against
public policy.”89 Clearly, they argued, unequal bargaining power
constituted evidence of coercion that made truck contracts
unconscionable and, therefore, unenforceable under principles of
equity. If such contracts should not be honored in Pennsylvanian
courts, Hines considered it the duty of legislature to negate that
wrong: “Contracts which take away the free rights of citizens are
oppressive and should be prohibited by law . . . such a contract is
not just and should not be protected by law.”90
86Billmeyer v. Evans & Rodenbaugh, 40 Pa. Ct. 324 (1861). In this case, Susan Billmeyer
signed a contract that waived her right to an 1861 stay law, but then she resisted the
stay of execution. Judge Warren Woodward, who wrote the court’s opinion, stated,
“If the parties to a contract include in it the legal remedy by which it is to be
enforced, a legislative enactment changing the remedial process agreed on in regard
to that contract, is as clearly unconstitutional as the attempt to impair the obligation
of any other contract.”
87Daniel R. Ernst, Lawyers Against Labor: From Individual Rights to Corporate Liberalism
(Urbana, IL, 1995), 69, 75, 81. Also, Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law, 226–27.
88PA Legis. Record, 1879, 1849; 1881, 487.
89Ibid., 1879, 1849.
90Ibid., 1848.
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Representative Hines concluded his 1879 remarks with a litany of
equity cases supporting his position. He gave special attention to
Bishop v. Reed, an 1843 case that involved a contract to build two
locks on the Erie Canal. William Bishop had promised work on
the locks to William Reed and Reed’s partners on the condition
that they provide collateral in the form of a mortgage on the Reed
home in Millersburg, Pennsylvania. When the work stipulated in
the contract with the state of New York was not carried out in a
timely manner, the Board of Canal Commissioners canceled the con-
tract. Having already invested time and money into the venture,
Bishop sued to recover the Reed homestead. He argued that Reed
knew of the risk involved when he entered the contract. The attor-
ney general, however, insisted that “common mistake of the parties”
rendered the contract void. Though they had both entered into the
agreement as sui juris equals, the unfair outcome of the agreement
rendered it inadequate and void.
In the Bishop decision, Judge Charles Huston provided a brief lesson
in principles of equity. At law a sealed contract proved adequate
consideration of both parties, but chancery courts operated differ-
ently. In England, chancery courts could declare a contract void
“on making out a case of fraud, [or] want of consideration [and
plaintiffs] could obtain a perpetual injunction against any execution
of the judgment at law.” Judge Huston continued that these prin-
ciples of equity persisted in America, paraphrasing Justice Joseph
Story’s influential Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence (1835–36),
wherein Story held that contracts could be dissolved in cases
“where there is an admixture of ingredients going to establish mis-
representation, imposition, undue confidence, undue influence,
mental imbecility, or that sort of surprise which equity uniformly
regards as a just foundation for relief.”91 Judge Huston built on
Story’s argument for equitable constraints on contract legitimacy
when he wrote:
Where parties have presupposed some facts or rights
to exist as the basis of their proceeding, which in truth
did not exist, such contracts made in mutual error,
under circumstances material to their character and
consequences, seem on general principles invalid
and notes Lord Hardwicke, in Chesterfield v. Jan[s]
sen, arranges [sic] among contracts which will be
relieved against, such bargains as no man in his
91Bishop v. Reed, 265.
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senses and not under delusion, would make on one
hand, and no honest and fair man would accept on
the other hand.92
Hines, then, borrowed from these nineteenth-century equity prin-
ciples to demonstrate a persistent legal tradition that would not
accept truck contracts as legitimate.
Incontrovertible evidence of economic coercion and inadequate con-
sideration remained elusive, while what counted as evidence of dur-
ess also generated debate. Nevertheless, the reframing of the truck
system as illegitimate due to the absence of voluntary consent
implied the authority to restrict such private labor contracts.
Hines began his argument with the uncontroversial statement that
the legislature had the power to pass statutes that altered contrac-
tual arrangements. Hines pushed the legislature to consider com-
pany store scrip as illegitimate compensation for wage labor
contracts, though he found the entire company store system as
offensive to the common law in itself:
But does any man surrender any right to his wages
and to his pay in lawful money by his voluntary
assent, when his assent in such cases has been
obtained by an enforced condition of employment
or of terms of payment? May not the legislature pro-
vide that such conditions, unconscionable because
not voluntary, shall not be competent and admissible
evidence in a course of action in which the simple
elements of the contract are the primary facts to
considered?93
Advocates of an anti-truck law needed a consensus to accept that
these labor contracts constituted an unconscionable or coercive vio-
lation of equity principles and therefore violated contract rules at
common law.
92Ibid. In Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen (1751), 2 Ves. Sr. 125, 155, Lord Hardwicke
arranged the forms of fraud under equity jurisdiction into four categories, the
second of which is most relevant to the anti-truck debate: “It may be apparent
from the intrinsic nature and subject of the bargain itself; such as no man in his
senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest
and fair man would accept on the other; which are unequitable and unconscientious
bargains; and of such even the common law has taken notice; for which, if it would
not look a little ludicrous.”
93PA Legis. Record, 1879, 1848.
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Senators W. C. A. Lawrence and Andrew Jackson Herr, who led the
opposition to anti-truck legislation, denied that such contracts
intrinsically involved economic coercion. They further focused on
the 1876 constitution’s prohibition of special or local legislation.
Despite Herr’s condemnation of the bill as a violation of the legisla-
ture’s circumscribed power to regulate certain contracts, a voice vote
in the Senate held that the bill’s intent did not violate contract free-
dom.94 Undaunted, Senators Herr and Lawrence cited prominent
case law and legal treatises that defined special legislation as isolat-
ing a group of citizens within a particular class, whether by intent of
the legislature or direct statutory language.95
Proponents of the bill insisted that “a statute which relates to per-
sons or things, as a class, [is] general law, while a statute which
relates to a particular person or things of a class, is special, and
comes within the constitutional prohibition.”96 They contended,
for example, that the legislature already possessed the ability to clas-
sify cities for the purpose of specific regulations and tax purposes,
which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed in Wheeler
v. Philadelphia.97 In that case, an 1874 law classified cities into
three categories based on population size and regulated the passage
of ordinances regarding municipal indebtedness, criminal punish-
ments, and future incorporations. Opponents of Philadelphia’s sew-
age extension plans had charged that the act comprised an
unconstitutional local law.98 The state supreme court upheld the
law as a necessary and time-honored device to govern cities of
different sizes, “and its exercise was necessary for the promotion
of the public welfare.” The court’s opinion sustained legislation
that classed cities for a variety of matters, such as taxing real estate,
drawing judicial districts, and protecting disenfranchised women.99
94Ibid., 1232.
95Herr cited decisions denying the constitutionality of special acts of legislation,
such as The People, ex rel. John McConvill v. Isaac Hills, 35 N.Y. 449 (1866). In this rul-
ing, the New York Supreme Court struck down an 1865 law that changed the elec-
toral process for the Rochester and Genesee Valley Railroad Company board of
directors because the amendment failed to reveal these changes in the title of the
bill, contradicting a provision of the New York constitution.
96PA Legis. Record, 1879, 1227.
97Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77 P. F. Smith 338 (1875).
98Senator Herr refuted the claim that the anti-truck bill was a permissible use of class
legislation: “The legislature has the power to classify cities,” but the Court had not
gone so far “as to say that when you have established a class or make a classifi-
cation, that you can take out of that class or that classification certain particular
and certain individuals.” PA Legis. Record, 1879, 1231.
99Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 349.
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The anti-truck act passed the House and Senate in 1879 but met
Governor John F. Hartranft’s veto later that summer. Although his
annual messages to the General Assembly often called for greater
attention to the “labor question,” the former union general tended
to embrace a self-help attitude that closely mirrored the free-labor
principles of Jacksonian equal rights and individual autonomy. In
his January 1879 annual message, Hartranft recognized the problem
of labor unrest in the commonwealth. Still, he called only for volun-
tary arbitration agreements between employers and employees.100
Holding the 1879 anti-truck act special and therefore unconstitu-
tional under Article 3, Section 7 of the 1874 Pennsylvania consti-
tution, the governor vetoed it. Similar to Curtin’s 1863 veto,
Hartranft proclaimed the act too great an extension of “protective
and paternal government.”101 Although he came to support recog-
nition of labor unions and arbitration agreements, the governor
implied that workingmen’s private labor contracts had distinctive
qualities. In contrast to the circumstances that led to the Wheeler
v. Philadelphia decision, the case of workingmen’s labor contracts
did not concern municipal contracts, bonds, or exclusive privileges
that the General Assembly might affect with general legislation.
Later that year, the election of Governor Henry Martin Hoyt, a
Republican who campaigned to alleviate the strains of the truck sys-
tem, renewed the possibility of the anti-truck law’s passage. During
Hoyt’s campaign, the Republican Party feared a possible coalition
between Greenbackers and a resurgent Democratic Party.
Concessions to the Greenbackers—Schnatterly and Hines were the
most notable Greenbackers in the General Assembly—allowed
Hoyt to capture the governorship by 22,000 votes over his
Democratic opponent, Andrew H. Dill.102 In his first address to
the General Assembly, Hoyt called for legislative action to end the
problem of the truck system. The new governor suggested that the
legislature note the information gathered by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics concerning the truck system’s detrimental impact on the
wage system.103 Hoyt made sure to warn the legislature against
100Governor Hartranft, Address to the General Assembly, Jan. 4, 1879, in Pennsylvania
Governor: Messages and Addresses (Harrisburg, 1874–83), 15.
101Papers of the Governors (Harrisburg, 1871–1883), 9:830.
102Pennsylvania Manual, vol. 101 (Harrisburg, PA, 1972–73).
103On Jan. 4, 1881, Hoyt told the General Assembly: “The tendency to, or existence
of, such mischief as the ‘truck’ or store order system would come under notice, and
well-considered legislation, based on adequate facts, could be invoked for its sup-
pression. The proper relation between the wage-laborer and the owner of the wage-
fund, in the divisions of the product of their joint enterprise, would more clearly
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passing any overtly special laws, which he would be constitution-
ally bound to veto. With that, the 1881 legislature reconsidered
the 1879 Schnatterly-Hines anti-truck proposal.
Schnatterly focused his energies on proving the necessity and consti-
tutionality of the anti-truck bill.104 In the House, Representative
John F. Welsh, a former miner and W.B.A. organizer from
Schuylkill, sponsored the bill.105 The 1881 anti-truck bill expanded
the permissible methods of wage payment to incorporate not only
cash, but cash orders as well.106 Also, the bill did not prohibit own-
ing or operating company stores, but rather mandated the lawful
payments of wage at monthly intervals. Perhaps most controversial,
labor reformers maintained that no contracts contrary to the law
could be legitimate.
Schnatterly and Welsh began by clarifying the supposed problems
with the previous act and distinguishing it from their current bill.
Hartranft, they argued, had not vetoed the bill because it violated
a “freedom of contract” per se; he objected to “class legislation”
that identified one group of male constituents as incapable of mak-
ing legitimate contracts.107 Finally, Hartranft had concluded that it
“tended too much to set up a protective and paternal govern-
ment.”108 Similar objections had arisen from Representative Elisha
W. Davis, a long-time opponent of anti-truck regulation. Yet when
Schnatterly and Welsh called for a vote in the House regarding
whether or not the new bill interfered with the making of private
appear, and an equitable plan of arbitration adopted, instead of the unprofitable and
destructive remedy by a strike.” Pennsylvania Governor: Messages and Addresses,
1874–1881, 31.
104PA Legis. Record, 1881, 2239.
105Welsh represented one of the most productive coal producing regions in the com-
monwealth. A former miner, he admitted being discharged from a Schuylkill mine
for “advocating the rights of my fellow workmen.” Welsh sponsored several pieces
of protective legislation in the 1881 session, including a mine ventilation and safety
act. Ibid., 1503. On Welsh’s role in the W.B.A., Kenny, Molly Maguires, 176.
106PA Legis. Record, 1881, 812. Schnatterly explained, “When an operator is unable to
pay cash he can pay by cash order, which carries him over at least three months, and
he can still carry himself, if his credit is good and if he furnishes goods and supplies
to the employees at reasonable and fair prices the same as are furnished by the mer-
chants. For, if the employee does not present his cash order when it is due, no penal-
ties, under this law, attach to the employer.”
107Schnatterly stated that Governor Hartranft’s veto message “acting by and with
the advice of the Attorney General, made no allegation that the third section of
this bill restricted the right of contract. It is not alleged in the veto message of
1879.” Ibid., 816.
108Schnatterly paraphrasing Hantraft in ibid.
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contracts, an overwhelming majority voted that the bill was not a
violation of “freedom of contract.”109
Nevertheless, opponents in the Senate continued to argue that the
bill removed rights from workers, that it relegated them to a status
of dependency reliant on legislative protection. Senator John
C. Newmyer, for example, stated:
I am in favor of allowing men to make their contracts
upon the best terms that can be obtained . . . of allow-
ing men to act as free men and not in favor of the
State interposing and attempting to act as guardians
for them. . . . By such legislation we in effect say to
them, ‘You do not know what is best for yourself,
but we in our superior wisdom will make your con-
tracts for you, notwithstanding you may be satisfied
to trust your own judgment.’110
Likewise, Senator George V. Lawrence agreed that a prohibition on
overcharging in company stores seemed reasonable, but the
Schnatterly-Welsh bill went too far, and he predicted a gubernator-
ial veto.111
Opponents ridiculed the legislation by drawing an analogy between
workingmen and other groups of persons whose employment con-
tracts the state regulated. Senator Norris stated his unyielding objec-
tions in a way that captured the contemporary defense of
workingmen’s contract freedom:
I for one am not ready to assume this responsibility,
nor am I ready in this chamber to pronounce them
a lot of imbeciles that need our aid. I think this discus-
sion is an insult to the intelligence and character of
the workingmen of Pennsylvania and I for one resent
it upon them. I believe they are just as capable of
taking care of their rights as we are.112
These notions of contract freedom and individual liberty resonated
with the postbellum tradition that assumed all pre-contractual
109Ibid., 492. In a roll call on the question, “Does this bill interfere with the making of
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conditions of the laborer adequately ensured the freedom of will
required for meaningful volition and equitable exchange.
According to this reasoning, protective legislation should be
reserved to protect people deemed disenfranchised or marginalized.
Examples included the married women’s property and earnings
acts.113 Opponents argued that if workingmen were to be subsumed
into the category of those protected by equity principles, they would
be shrouded with paternal protection by the State.114 It was that fear
of relegating white workingmen to a status of dependency compar-
able to that of a woman, lunatic, or child that became the opposi-
tions’ most powerful and oft-cited argument against regulations to
abolish the company store system, even though some opponents
may have personally agreed that the company store system indeed
made men unfree.
On June 29, 1881, Governor Hoyt signed the Schnatterly-Welsh anti-
truck act, but the problem of the truck system did not disappear.115
Five years later, when Frank Wigeman sued Godcharles &
Company for payment of wages in company store scrip, he had
reason to believe he would receive his $87.67 in arrears. The law
had already been enforced in local courts.116 Indeed, Wigeman
won his first trial in the Northumberland Court of Common
Pleas.117 On appeal, however, Godcharles challenged the constitu-
tionality of the law, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reopened
the debate on the meaning of workingmen’s freedom.
William H. Hackenberg, a Republican officeholder from Milton and
legal defense for Godcharles, attacked the constitutionality of the
113Reva Siegel, “Home As Work: The First Women’s Rights Claims Concerning
Wives’ Household Labor, 1850–1880,” Yale Law Journal 103 (1994): 1073–1218.
Joseph Story grouped women along with “infants and lunatics” as individuals
entitled to protection by equity courts. Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence,
rev. ed. (Boston, 1839), 2:654–55.
114Fox, “Law of Many Faces,” 102, asserts, “Even at its best, equity was another
source of paternalism which, in its protection for women, ultimately reinforced
women’s legal subordination.”
115William B. Shaw, “Social and Economic Legislation of the States in 1891,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics 6 (Jan. 1892): 227–42.
116In Kettering v. Imperial Coal Co., 32 Pitts. L.J. 359 (1885), the lower court held that
despite doubts about the merits of the law, the “payment of wages in store orders
was illegal.” In Row v. Haddock, 3 Kulp 501 (1885), the lower court ruled in favor
of the coal company because the worker had already received his wages in kind.
This case did not challenge the constitutionality of the law as a whole.
117Godcharles, 431.
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1881 law on two grounds. First, he contended that the law violated
Pennsylvania’s 1874 constitutional prohibition on special or local
legislation because it affected only mining and manufacturing
workers. Further, he insisted that the mandatory law restricting
workingmen’s contract freedom also violated the free labor prin-
ciple of equal rights. All workingmen, he argued, should be free
to make their own labor contracts. Quoting the 1873 constitutional
convention debates, he stated, “‘Equal privileges for all, exclusive
privileges for none, should be the sentiment of every citizen of
this Commonwealth.’”118 This notion of formal legal equality left lit-
tle room for the legislature to positively enhance the bargaining
power of workingmen in the so-called ordinary trades, particularly
with regard to wage contracts. Accordingly, only private contracts
could rewrite these customary employment relations.
In Godcharles v. Wigeman, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed
Hackenberg’s attack. For the court, the meaning of freedom for
ordinary workingmen was not contested—it was defined by one’s
ability to make private labor contracts free from legislative interfer-
ence. Justice Gordon wrote:
An attempt has been made by the legislature to do
what, in this country, cannot be done; that is, prevent
persons who are sui juris from making their own con-
tracts. The Act is an infringement alike of the right of
the employer and the employe[e]; more than this, it is
an insulting attempt to put the laborer under a legis-
lative tutelage, which is not only degrading to his
manhood, but subversive of his rights as a citizen of
the United States.119
The Court enforced the set-off contracts made by the private parties
and struck down the legislative mandate that wage payments be
made in cash or cash orders. A legally competent workingman,
Gordon proclaimed,
may sell his labor for what he thinks best, whether
money or goods, just as his employer may sell his
iron or coal, and any and every law that proposes
to prevent him from so doing is an infringement of
118Pennsylvania Constitutional Debates (Harrisburg, 1873), 2:590; Godcharles, 435.
119Godcharles, 437.
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his constitutional privileges, and consequently vicious
and void.120
Thus, Gordon enforced private employment contracts as the sole
legal mechanism by which to determine the obligations of employer
and employee.121
Gordon did not mention the constitutional prohibition of special
legislation; his brief 335-word opinion provided scant legal reason-
ing. He did not explicitly refer back to legislative debates, nor did he
honor the customary presumption of constitutionality of legislative
acts. The ruling’s rhetoric suggested that nearly all labor legislation
would be found unconstitutional. The decision, therefore, had sub-
stantial long-term effects on the “liberty of contract” regime, as well
as on historical and legal understandings of it. A charitable reading
might explain the brevity and imprecision of Gordon’s opinion on
the grounds that Gordon believed that the bench and bar already
knew that the sanctity of workingmen’s contracts forbade wage
regulations. The ruling, however, encouraged progressive historians
to seek extra-legal interpretations of the justices’ motives. The case
thus gained notoriety as a thinly veiled effort to constitutionalize
laissez-faire economic principles, which became the bedrock of the
“liberty of contract” doctrine that lasted until the New Deal era.
This paper has suggested that that explanation is too simple, though
it is still true that the Godcharles ruling substantially shaped the judi-
ciary’s response to the labor movement. Although the case was not
explicitly about “due process,” it aided the rise of “substantive due
process” by contributing to a series of similar state rulings striking
down labor laws as class legislation that unconstitutionally abridged
120Ibid.
121The highly individualized and formalized legal rules of workingmen’s employment
contracts that such rulings put in place effectively negated the application of equity
principles to equalize employer-employee bargaining power. By the last decade of
the nineteenth century, courts’ equitable powers were generally deployed against
laborers in the form of injunctive relief to end labor strikes. For this reason, labor
unions and workers began to assail equity and especially judges who issued injunc-
tions without juries, which may have been more sympathetic to the interests of
labor. Liberty of contract belonged to laborers as individuals but not to incorporated
entities. Hovenkamp describes the result: “Collective bargaining agreements were
never given the kind of preferred constitutional treatment accorded to other corporate
contracts. . . . Although the bare right to strike was eventually accorded constitutional
protection, it was a right that had to be exercised within the strictest non-coercive
limits.” Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law, 235.
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workingmen’s contract freedom.122 In his now-infamous decision,
Justice Gordon cited only one case, Millet v. Illinois, which relied
on the Illinois state constitution’s due process clause.123 In that
case, the Illinois Supreme Court struck down a law that required
coal mines to furnish standardized scales and a check-weigh-man
and to determine wages based on a prescribed system of weighing
coal.124 Similar to Godcharles, the Millet decision hinged on
whether it is competent for the General Assembly to
single out owners and operators of coal mines as a
distinct class, and provide that they shall bear bur-
dens not imposed on other owners of property or
employers of laborers, and prohibit them from mak-
ing contracts which it is competent for other owners
of property or employers of laborers to make.125
The Illinois court found the regulation did not meet the acceptable
“definition of police regulations” because it did “not have reference
to the comfort, the safety or the welfare of society” as a whole and
thus violated the state constitution’s due process clause.126 When
West Virginia enacted a similar law regarding the payment of
miners’ wages, the West Virginia Supreme Court held that it vio-
lated both the state’s due process clause as well as the U.S.
Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment.127 Then, in Lochner
122The term “substantive due process” originated in the 1930s to describe (and
usually denigrate) legal rulings that struck down labor laws as distended police
powers. David N. Mayer, “Substantive Due Process Rediscovered: The Rise and
Fall of Liberty of Contract,” Mercer Law Review 60 (2009): 563–658, esp. 586;
G. Edward White, “Revisiting Substantive Due Process and Holmes’s Lochner
Dissent,” Brooklyn Law Review 63 (1997): 87–128, esp. 88–89.
123Millet v. People, 7 N.E. 631 (1886), 636.
124Ibid., 633.
125Ibid. In 1891, the Illinois legislature responded to the Millet ruling with a law that
forbade the ownership of company stores by any mining or manufacturing com-
pany. The following year the state supreme court struck that down as well. Frorer
v. People, 141 Ill. 171 (1892). See also: “Constitutional Law—Anti-Truck Law,” The
Albany Law Journal: A Weekly Record of the Law and the Lawyers 46 (Jul. 30, 1892):
87–91.
126Millet, 634.
127State v. Goodwill; State v. Minor, 33 W. Va. 179 (1889). The two cases were com-
bined, given their similarities. The court ruled that the statute “was a paternalistic
law of the most objectionable character because it assumed that the employer was
a knave and the laborer an imbecile.” Frederick N. Judson, “Liberty of Contract
Under the Police Power,” American Law Review 25 (Nov/Dec. 1891): 893, explained,
“The legislature cannot limit or forbid the right of contract between parties under no
mental, corporal or other disability when the subject of contract is lawful, not public
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v. New York, the U.S. Supreme Court infamously adopted this
interpretation of the due process clause as protecting workingmen’s
“liberty of contract” against state police power regulations deemed
to affect only a particular trade. Women were included in this cat-
egory after they gained the right to vote.128 That precedent lasted
into the New Deal era, until it was overturned in 1937, when the
Court upheld Washington state’s minimum wage law and aban-
doned the courts’ protection of “freedom of contract” as established
in Godcharles.129
Ultimately, the Godcharles precedent irrevocably contributed to the
ascendancy of the “liberty of contract” doctrine and the decay of
equity principles in workingmen’s employment relations.130 In the
1880s, unequal bargaining power between employer and employee,
which reformers argued reduced men to the status of dependency,
failed to justify the extension of police powers over workingmen’s
private contract freedom. Thus, the umbrella of equity protection
for disenfranchised or marginalized groups did not reach workers
in mining, industry, and many other places. The company store sys-
tem operated under the auspices of an “ordinary trade,” meaning
that it did not enjoy special privileges granted by the state, such
as eminent domain privileges, municipal bonds, or exclusive con-
tracts from the state. Neither equitable remedies nor the legal cat-
egories of public interest offered guidance to labor-strife
management in the so-called “ordinary trades.” Arguments over
economic coercion and resultant “wage slavery” had given rise to
a politically salient labor reform movement. Still, legislators
in its character, and the exercise of it is purely private and personal between the per-
sons themselves.” In that same year, the West Virginia supreme court struck down a
law that prohibited the increase in prices in company stores, a tactic that the
Pennsylvanian legislature had also considered. State v. Fire Creek Coal & Coke Co.,
33 W. Va. 188 (1889). See C. B. Labatt, “State Regulation of the Contract of
Employment,” American Law Review 27 (Nov./ Dec., 1893): 857–75.
128Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923). The Court struck down a
women’s minimum wage law in Washington, D.C.
129West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). The Court upheld a state mini-
mum wage law, overturning the Adkins precedent. West Coast Hotel is usually
regarded as ending the Lochner era.
130Roscoe Pound, “The Decadence of Equity,” Columbia Law Review 5 (Jan. 1905): 20–
35, argues that the formalization of equity principles in case law combined with the
nineteenth-century ideal of uniform and general laws led to the decline of equity as
a rival jurisdiction to common law. “But in becoming law a principle of equity loses
its quality of elasticity. . . . The very thing that made equity a system must in the end
prove fatal to it. In the very act of becoming a system, it becomes legalized, and in
becoming merely a competing system of law insures its ultimate downfall” (24–25).
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floundered in their search for solutions within the increasingly crys-
tallized parameters of law and equity.
How could the state not improve working conditions so as to pro-
tect and perhaps positively enhance those negative rights that
made men free? Even if freedom of contract defined individual
workingmen’s private liberty, the state still retained police powers
to protect public health, safety, and morals. Although in some
parts of the United States, the company store system persisted
into the mid-twentieth century,131 the Pennsylvania anti-truck
movement had successfully challenged classical law and ideology
that constrained liberal-democratic solutions to protect laborers
against unconscionable contracts. The Godcharles ruling was a
blow to the labor movement. It affected labor’s legal strategy and
tactics, but it did not deter the labor movement.
The case signaled two important changes in Gilded Age constitu-
tionalism and labor activism: the delineation of equity principles
in wage labor disputes in favor of formal legal rules of contract,
as well as the incipient unraveling of class legislation in labor law
that accompanied the gradual expansion of police powers. As
other scholars have noted, the courts’ rejection of protective labor
laws for workingmen caused a reaction in the labor movement,
encouraging groups like the American Federation of Labor, founded
in 1886, to adopt the language of “liberty of contract” to protect their
collective bargaining goals. “Collective laissez faire,” as opposed to
a strictly individualistic “liberty of contract,” envisioned a new sys-
tem of industrial pluralism, wherein labor unions could bargain as
equals with corporate employers.132 Moreover, while Gilded Age
courts limited police power regulations to the protection of
women and children—those dependents who were not deemed
sui juris to make their own contracts—Progressive Era reforms
pushed harder at these boundaries. Louis Brandeis and Josephine
Goldmark, for example, built on the labor studies pioneered by
Francis Amasa Walker and other reformers and popularized the
field of sociological jurisprudence, which expanded police power
categories for groups of marginalized workers. Workingmen still
had to prove their trade to be unsafe or unhealthy or in the public
interest in order to pass constitutional muster, but by the early twen-
tieth century, progressive reformers possessed more legal resources
131Gordon Dodrill, 20,000 Coal Company Stores in the United States, Mexico and Canada
(Pittsburgh, 1971).
132Ernst, Lawyers Against Labor, 2.
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to do so. Ultimately, the Godcharles decision played a critical role in
creating Gilded Age trends in law and legislation that fragmented
the labor movement into separate classes of workers and occu-
pations and diminished the likelihood of a nationwide, class-
oriented labor movement. Similar to the anti-truck movement, the
progressive advocates of protective labor legislation continued to
complicate these existing categories of contract freedom and class
legislation.
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